among current and former welfare recipients. The questions include the following:
• What characteristics are associated with a higher probability of exiting from food stamp receipt versus remaining on the rolls after the 1996 welfare reform?
• What characteristics are associated with a higher probability of returning to food stamps after a postwelfare reform exit from the rolls?
• What impact, if any, did two state policy changes-the switch to an Electronic Benefi t Transfer (EBT) system and changes in eligibility rules concerning assets-have on food stamp receipt?
The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefl y summarize previous relevant studies. Next, we describe welfare policy changes in Michigan, particularly as they relate to the Food Stamp Program. We then describe our panel data, our analytic strategy, and the measures we use. Then, we present empirical results and conclude with a discussion of policy implications.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON FOOD STAMP DYNAMICS
While a large literature has examined the correlates of entry and exit from the cash welfare roles, both before and after welfare reform (e.g., Blank and Ruggles 1996; Grogger and Michalopoulos 2003) , fewer studies have focused on food stamp dynamics. While we do not review all studies here, we highlight several that examine the role that individual factors, public policies, and the macroeconomy play in food stamp dynamics. Zedlewski and Gruber (2001) and Zedlewski (2004) analyze data from the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF) and fi nd that poor households that recently received cash welfare are more likely to use food stamps than are poor households that have no prior welfare receipt. However, the two studies fi nd few differences in the personal characteristics of food stamp users versus nonusers: those with less education and African Americans were more likely to remain on the rolls, but other characteristics, such as poor physical or mental health, were not signifi cantly different between food stamp participants and nonparticipants (Zedlewski 2004) . McKernan and Ratcliffe (2003) use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to examine the correlates of food stamp participation among low-income working households. They fi nd that those working traditional daytime hours, holding multiple jobs, and working more hours are less likely to participate. However, this relationship between employment and participation was stronger in the early 1990s than in the late 1990s, suggesting that program efforts to decrease barriers to participation may have become more successful.
The study most closely related to ours is that of Hefl in (2004), who examines food stamp exits and returns using the Women's Employment Study. She fi nds that women who move into work are more likely to leave both cash assistance and the Food Stamp Program. Those who are married, have other adults in the household, and meet the diagnostic screening criteria for drug dependence are more likely to exit, while those who are older, have less education, a shorter welfare history, more children, lack access to a car, and have less knowledge of eligibility rules are less likely to exit. Hefl in uses the fi rst four waves of WES data, whereas we use all fi ve waves. Hefl in limits her sample to women whose incomes were below 130 percent of the poverty line, roughly the eligibility limit for the Food Stamp Program. However, her method for calculating household income is not exactly the same as the one that the welfare agency uses to determine program eligibility. Also, WES collected detailed household income for the month of the survey, not for every month.
Our analyses build upon and extend Hefl in's work by using all fi ve survey waves and including all respondents. Most importantly, Hefl in estimates the hazard of exiting from food stamps, whereas we distinguish between recipients who exit from food stamps while working and those who exit without a job, and, as discussed below, fi nd that many individual characteristics have differential effects on these exit types.
Other studies examine how program policies and the economy affect food stamp usage. Danielson and Klerman (2006) fi nd that welfare reform and an improving economy explain food stamp caseload declines during the late 1990s, while policies aimed at increasing program access and the weakening economy explain about half of the caseload increase in the early 2000s. Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold (2007) combine data from SIPP and state-level policy data to test the effects of various welfare, food stamp, minimum wage, and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) policies on food stamp receipt. They fi nd that in states with more lenient vehicle exemption policies, longer periods between eligibility recertifi cation, and expanded categorical eligibility (e.g., deeming families receiving services funded through TANF automatically eligible for food stamps), food stamp receipt increases. On the other hand, biometric technology (such as fi ngerprint imaging) reduces food stamp receipt. Simplifi ed reporting and implementation of the EBT program, which moved food stamps from coupons to an electronic swipe card, increase food stamp receipt. Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008) use state administrative data from South Carolina and fi nd that exits from the Food Stamp Program are fi ve to six times higher in months in which families have to recertify their eligibility than in other months. Once South Carolina increased the length of time between eligibility recertifi cation, median spell lengths of food stamp receipt increased by nearly three months for households with earnings.
Our analyses build on these previous studies. Before describing our model, we review the policy context in Michigan.
THE POLICY CONTEXT IN MICHIGAN, 1997-2003
The Food Stamp and TANF programs have different eligibility limits, treatment of earnings, defi nition of the family unit, and so on, but the rules in one may affect use of the other. Michigan began adopting a work-fi rst approach to welfare in 1994, requiring some recipients to participate in activities designed to move them into employment quickly (Seefeldt, Danziger, and Danziger 2003) . Once PRWORA passed, all but a small number of recipients (for example, those with disabilities or those caring for children or other family members with disabilities) were required to participate in job search activities immediately after applying for cash assistance. Failure to comply with these or other requirements could result in loss of benefi ts, either immediately (for new applicants) or gradually (for those who were already recipients).
Michigan is one of 16 states that link receipt of food stamp benefi ts to compliance with TANF or other means-tested program rules (USDA 2004). A mother not complying with TANF rules could face reduction or loss of TANF cash benefi ts for her entire family along with elimination of her individual food stamp allotment. In other states, food stamp benefi ts may not increase when TANF benefi ts are reduced by sanctioning, but the noncompliant adult may not lose her food stamp benefi ts (Zedlewski, Holcomb, and Duke 1998) .
As of April 1997, Michigan recipients on TANF for fewer than 60 days and not complying with work requirements could be terminated immediately from TANF and be hit with a reduction in food stamp benefi ts. Those receiving TANF for at least 60 days prior to noncompliance faced a 25 percent reduction in both TANF and food stamp benefi ts, and their TANF case would be closed if noncompliance continued for four months. 1 Recipients who followed the new rules could combine work, cash welfare, and food stamps, or just work and food stamps, depending on their monthly earnings. Like most states, Michigan changed its earned income disregard to encourage work; it allowed TANF recipients to keep the fi rst $200 of monthly earnings and 20 percent of the remainder. In 1997, a single mother with two children earning $6 an hour for 20 hours of work a week could receive about $200 a month in TANF and about $310 in food stamps. If she worked 35 hours a week, she would lose all TANF benefi ts but would still receive about $300 in food stamps. 2 The PRWORA implemented a lifetime limit on receipt of cash assistance: adults could receive TANF for no more than 60 months cumulatively in their lifetime, or fewer months if the states where they lived chose a shorter time limit. All states must abide by the prohibition against using federal TANF funds for families exceeding this 60-month limit. However, Michigan is one of two states that did not put time limits on cash assistance. 3 Instead, the state uses its own funds to provide cash assistance to recipients who reach the federal limit and are in compliance with program rules.
Several analysts (Blank and Schmidt 2001; Pavetti and Bloom 2001; Zedlewski, Holcomb, and Duke 1998) developed post-PRWORA classifi cations of the stringency of state policy regimes. Most labeled Michigan's policies as "moderate" or "mixed." Policies such as the requirement to engage immediately in work activities (the federal requirement at the time was, within 24 months, to start looking for work or to participate in activities geared toward fi nding a job) and the possibility of full-family sanctions were strict. Others, such as the lack of a time limit, were lenient. The state's cash benefi t in the late 1990s was higher than average-$459 a month for a family of three with no other income, compared to $379 for the median state. However, the earned income disregard policy was not especially generous, and only parttime and low-wage workers could combine welfare and work. As noted above, a single mother with two children who worked 35 hours a week at a job paying $6 an hour was not eligible for cash assistance; in 24 other states, she would be eligible.
Even (HHS 2005) . In Michigan, the food stamp participation rate among eligible families is estimated to be 65 percent, well above the 56 percent national average (Castner and Schirm 2005) . It is unclear the extent to which this higher participation rate is related to particular state practices, to the state's distressed economy, or to some combination of the two.
As noted, Michigan families who are sanctioned for noncompliance with TANF rules can also lose their food stamps. Sanctioned families are more likely to be disadvantaged than nonsanctioned recipients on measures such as low education or poor health (Cherlin et al. 2002; Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang 2002) . If these disadvantages also make it less likely that sanctioned adults fi nd jobs, then they might be more likely to reapply for TANF, food stamps, or both. On the other hand, if these disadvantages make it diffi cult for sanctioned adults to understand program rules about why they were sanctioned or how they might become eligible again, then they might be less likely to reapply.
Michigan's choice about how frequently to require food stamp recipients to recertify their eligibility affects participation, as shorter recertifi cation periods are associated with lower program use (Kabbani and Wilde 2003) . Federal policy requires that all cases with working adults be redetermined for eligibility at least once every 12 months. Before passage of the 2002 Farm Bill, states could choose periods as short as six months for working recipients in an effort to lower program error rates. In Michigan, TANF recipients are subject to the federal 12-month recertifi cation period; those not on TANF must be recertifi ed every six months if they have earnings (USDA 2003) . Frequent recertifi cations might reduce participation, particularly among working TANF leavers, as more frequent updating of eligibility raises participation costs.
Michigan simplifi ed reporting requirements for TANF and food stamp recipients, which may ease administrative burdens. Typically, families must report any changes in employment, earnings, or income, along with other changes that could affect eligibility. For adults whose earnings or employment status changes frequently, this reporting requirement might be burdensome. With simplifi ed reporting for the Food Stamp Program, families must report changes in earned income only when they exceed 130 percent of usual monthly earnings (USDA 2003) .
Other policy changes might have affected participation over our study period. First, between 1996 and 2000, Michigan faced federal penalties for having food stamp overpayment of benefi ts by rates of 11 to 16 percent, which was above the national 9 percent rate (Seefeldt, Danziger, and Danziger 2003) . In an effort to achieve compliance, the state devoted extra resources during 2000 and 2001 to monitoring the Food Stamp Program. Increased monitoring might have deterred some working families from applying and caused others to be deemed ineligible.
Second, in 2001, because of federal program changes, Michigan adopted an Electronic Benefi t Transfer program (EBT) to distribute both TANF and food stamp benefi ts. Instead of receiving food coupons, recipients are issued a "Bridge Card," which functions like a debit card. Proponents argue that this reduces the stigma associated with food stamps, as shoppers using the Bridge Card appear no different than debitcard users at checkout counters. If stigma kept some recipients from using food stamps, then EBT might encourage a return to the rolls.
Michigan also changed how it treated assets in eligibility determination over the study period. Prior to 1997, Michigan received a federal waiver to exempt one vehicle from a client's assets. Because it was thought that car ownership would facilitate the transition from welfare to work, the state allowed recipients who owned cars to maintain eligibility for food stamps. In September of 1999, the waiver expired, and for about one year vehicles were included in the asset test for eligibility determination. Through a creative categorical eligibility policy, the state eventually exempted all vehicles from consideration.
Finally, changes in Michigan's economic climate are likely to have affected participation over time. In the fi rst few years following the 1996 reform, Michigan's economy was booming, and its unemployment rate was below the national average. However, the recession of 2001 and the continuing loss of manufacturing jobs led the unemployment rate to increase and remain above the national average. In 2003, the national unemployment rate was 6 percent, but in Michigan the rate was more than 7 percent.
DATA SOURCES
We analyze panel data from the Women's Employment Study (WES), conducted by the Program on Poverty and Social Welfare Policy at the University of Michigan. Respondents were chosen randomly from a list of white and African American women who received cash assistance as single-parent cases in February 1997 in one urban county in Michigan. Respondents were interviewed fi ve times over a six-year period (Fall 1997 , Fall 1998 , Fall 1999 , Fall 2001 , Fall 2003 . Response rates for the fi ve waves were high: 86, 92, 91, 91, and 93 percent, respectively. There were 753 respondents in the fi rst wave. Because there is little evidence that attrition from the sample was nonrandom, sample weights are not used (see Cadena and Pape [2006] for an analysis).
Information was gathered on factors known to affect welfare and food stamp usage, including employment, marriage and cohabitation, household size, race, and education. WES also gathered information on factors that are not usually available, including physical health and mental health status, experiences of domestic violence, child behavior, and health problems. WES also contains monthly administrative data on food stamp and TANF participation provided by the Michigan Family Independence Agency. 4 We combined survey and administrative data to create a panel data set with variables measured at the monthly level. We have measures of employment (self-reported) and TANF and food stamp receipt (administrative data) at this frequency. Most variables from the fi ve interviews were not measured on a monthly basis. We used retrospective relationship questions asked at each wave to create a monthly marriage and cohabitation history for each woman.
5 Most other questions refer to the respondent's experiences during the interval between surveys. We apply the values of these variables backwards in time for all months between interviews. For example, suppose that in the wave 3 interview (1999) a woman reports having experienced severe domestic abuse since the last interview but that she did not report abuse at the wave 2 interview (1998). We code her as experiencing abuse in each month between the wave 2 and the wave 3 interview, but as not experiencing abuse in any month between waves 1 and 2. This methodology is imperfect and introduces some measurement error.
TRENDS IN RECEIPT OF BENEFITS
Figure 5.1 shows monthly patterns of employment, cash welfare usage, and food stamp receipt. All respondents received TANF in February 1997, as benefi t receipt was the key study selection criterion. TANF receipt fell from February 1997 until early 2001, when it leveled off at about 20 percent and remained there until the study period ended. Almost all women received food stamps in February 1997. Receipt fell to about 45 percent by early 2000, stayed at this rate for about 18 months, and then increased to about 50 percent in spring 2002, where it remained for the duration of the study. The monthly employment rate increased from about 40 percent in February 1997 to about 75 percent in mid-2000; it then fell during and after the 2001 recession; so that it was just under 70 percent at the fi nal WES survey (Fall 2003) .
As employment fell after 2000, food stamp participation increased but TANF participation did not. These simple trends suggest that, after welfare reform, women were more likely to use food stamps than TANF in order to smooth temporary fl uctuations in earnings. We document this in Figure 5 .2.
We select a sample of all spells of nonemployment preceded by a month in which the woman was working and received neither food stamps nor cash welfare. This sample includes women who have successfully transitioned from welfare to work but who then experience at least one month of nonemployment. The Kaplan-Meier failure functions in Figure 5 .2 show the unconditional probability (i.e., not adjusted for covariates) that a woman will have returned to benefi t receipt after the number of months given on the x-axis. Women are more likely to return to food stamps than to cash assistance when work ends. After three months of nonemployment, 24 percent of women have returned to food stamps ( 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES-DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Our multivariate analyses examine three different aspects of food stamp dynamics. The fi rst examines factors that are associated with a recipient's exit from the food stamp spell that was in progress when the sample was drawn. At that time, the typical respondent had received welfare and food stamps for about 7.5 years since she reached age 18 and was in the midst of a 33-month spell. We consider the initial spell (fi rst exit) to be completed when she does not receive food stamps for two consecutive months. We treat spells that are ongoing at the date of the fi nal interview or that are ongoing when respondents leave the sample because of attrition as right-censored. We classify the initial exits into two types: 1) spells ending in a month in which the woman was employed and 2) spells ending in a month in which she was not employed. Because we do not know monthly earnings, we cannot directly measure whether a spell ended because a woman's income exceeded program limits. We consider exits with work as proxies for exits due to higher income. Exits that occur without work are likely the result of sanctions, family status changes like marriage or a child's becoming an adult, or situations in which eligible recipients fail to comply with program rules.
Because the WES sampling frame selected women receiving cash welfare benefi ts in February 1997 (spells-in-progress), it oversamples longtime recipients. Fortunately, our administrative data contain the date the current cash welfare spell began. We assume that the food stamp spell also began on this date. Thus, there is measurement error to the extent that the food stamp spell began at another time. For February 1997 we assign to each respondent the duration of the spell-in-progress. Our analysis of returns to food stamps after an exit is not subject to the length-bias problem. Figure 5 .3 displays the percentage of food stamp spells that end by a given month following the beginning of the spell. The darker line shows the percentage of spells that end when a woman exits from her food stamp spell in a month in which she is employed. The bottom line shows spells that end without employment. For example, 24 months after the spell began, 32 percent of women had left the rolls in a month in which they were employed, and 13 percent had left in a month in which they were without work. The remaining 55 percent of spells were still in progress. 6 The second analysis includes respondents who made a fi rst exit after April 1997 (the third month of the panel) and analyzes factors associated with their fi rst return to food stamp receipt. Each respondent contributes only one spell to each of the fi rst two samples. Figure 5 .4 displays this probability of returning. For example, at 24 months after their fi rst exit from food stamps, 61 percent of women had returned to the caseload. The third analysis focuses on returns to food stamps after spells of nonemployment. This dependent variable was shown in Figure  5 .2, Panel A.
Thus, food stamp participation is particularly dynamic. Most respondents exit the program at least once during the study period, and most women who exit their initial spell return. 
REGRESSION MODELS
We estimate regression models that address several questions about food stamp dynamics. First, which characteristics are associated with a higher probability of leaving the food stamp spell that was in progress when the WES study began (fi rst exit)? Do these covariates have different associations for work-based versus nonwork exits? Then, which characteristics are associated with a higher probability of returning to food stamps after exiting from the caseload (fi rst return)? Finally, which characteristics are associated with reentry to food stamps conditional on experiencing a transition from work to nonemployment?
We estimate the semiparametric proportional hazards model outlined in Cox (1972) . 7 The parameter of interest is the hazard rate λ(t)-the probability that a spell ends in month t given that it has lasted until t. Cox's model consists of two parts: 1) a baseline hazard that depends only on t (λ 0 [t]) and 2) a portion that depends on covariates. This specifi cation does not require parametric assumptions about the baseline Spell duration (months)
Fraction returning to food stamps after initial exit hazard; the time pattern can take any form as long as it is common across spells. We model the portion that depends on covariates using an exponential functional form. The complete hazard rate, conditional on covariates x and coeffi cients β, is therefore .
To estimate β, we assume that different covariate values lead to equal proportional changes in the likelihood that a spell ends in any month, regardless of the baseline probability. Our approach provides estimates that are robust to any form of time dependence in the baseline hazard. However, this approach does not allow us to test the nature of time dependence in the data.
As a robustness check, we include dummy variables for calendar years to control for unobserved differences in policies and state enforcement efforts over the study period. We report hazard ratios (exponentiated coeffi cients) and delta method-based standard errors. The coeffi cients can be interpreted as the proportional effect of a one-unit increase in the covariate on the probability of the spell ending in a given month. A hazard ratio equal to one means that women have an equal probability of exit for all values of the covariate. Ratios greater than one imply that an increase in the covariate increases the hazard rate; ratios less than one imply the opposite.
REGRESSION RESULTS
We fi rst analyze exits from the initial food stamp spell, treating exits accompanied by employment and exits without employment as independent competing risks. The baseline hazard and the effect of each covariate can vary by type of exit. The hazard function we estimate is thus , with 0 representing employment-based exits and 1 representing nonemployment-based exits. This specifi cation is equivalent to estimating separate models for each exit type (treating observations that end with
the other exit type as censored). By estimating a model that allows for both types of exits simultaneously, we can test whether the covariates have the same proportional effect for both exit types. 8 Table 5 .1 defi nes the variables we use and presents their means and standard deviations, the number of observations, and the frequency with which the observations are measured. For example, age, education, and race are measured at the fi rst wave in Fall 1997. On the other hand, as mentioned above, we have monthly information on employment and receipt of TANF and food stamps. The typical respondent was about 30 years old in 1997. About one-third of respondents had completed some education beyond high school, 37 percent had graduated from high school or completed a GED, and 31 percent had not fi nished high school. Over the course of the study period, a typical respondent worked for 67 percent of the months, received food stamps for 62 percent of the months, and received TANF for 40 percent of the months.
At a typical wave, many respondents reported physical and mental health problems; one advantage of WES over other welfare-reform data sets is the extent of this information. About one quarter of respondents reported physical limitations that placed them in the bottom quartile of functioning for their age and reported their overall health as fair or poor. About one-third met the diagnostic screening criteria for one of several psychiatric disorders measured in the WES instrument. Six percent had serious substance abuse problems, and 13 percent had experienced severe domestic abuse in the 12 months before the survey. These personal attributes, as documented elsewhere (Seefeldt and Orzol 2005; Turner, Danziger, and Seefeldt 2006) , are associated with reduced work and increased TANF receipt among WES respondents. Table 5 .2 presents the results for the exit from the food stamp spell that was in progress in February 1997. In each of the three specifi cations, the fi rst column reports hazard ratios for employment-based exits and the second column gives hazard ratios for exits without work; the fi nal column (denoted as "Diff") reports whether the proportional effect of the covariate on the hazard rate is signifi cantly different for the two exit types. The fi rst specifi cation includes only characteristics of women and their households that are fi xed at their 1997 values. Women with at least a high school degree are more likely to leave food stamps with a job in any given month than those who have not fi nished high school (the omitted category). There are no signifi cant effects of education on the likelihood of exiting without work. With or without work, African Americans are less likely than whites to exit from food stamps.
The coeffi cients on the fi xed attributes are attenuated in size and fall in signifi cance when we include the rich set of time-varying variables in the second specifi cation. This suggests that race and education are correlated with some of the variables included in the expanded model. Women living with a partner are more likely to exit with or without work than women not living with a partner: married women are 1.86 times as likely to exit with work-and cohabiting women 1.27 times as likely-as women who do not live with partners. A husband's fi nancial resources are more likely to raise a woman's family income above the food stamp eligibility cutoff. Those who cohabit with an employed partner may have less fi nancial need and hence be less likely to go through the recertifi cation process.
For a given level of income, women with larger families are eligible for larger food stamp benefi ts, making them less likely to lose their eligibility when working. The analysis supports this hypothesis: each additional person in the household reduces the likelihood of exit with work by about 12 percent.
Women with signifi cant problems with their physical or mental health or personal lives are less likely to fi nd and keep a job and hence less likely to exit food stamps with work. The evidence supports this hypothesis. For example, a woman with health problems is about 33 percent less likely to exit with work, a woman with a mental health problem about 30 percent less likely, and one with a child with learning, mental health, or health problems about 36 percent less likely. Some women whose children have persistent problems may have been exempted from the TANF work requirement (Seefeldt and Orzol 2005) .
Some critics of welfare reform expected that some recipients with many personal problems would fall through all the safety nets once reform was implemented (Edelman 1997) . The fact that there is no signifi cant relationship between personal problems and food stamp exits without work (hazard ratios near one in the second column of the second specifi cation) suggests that the most disadvantaged are no more likely than others to exit food stamps without work. On the other hand, other work with the WES (Turner, Danziger, and Seefeldt 2006) has shown that a small but growing proportion of women lose jobs and do NOTE: The number of observations for variables measured at the month or wave level is the number of valid person-months. Variables measured only at the wave level are assigned to individual months using the procedure described in the text.
a Although the marriage and cohabitation questions are only asked at each wave, they contain suffi cient detail to create an accurate monthly history. SOURCE: Authors' calculations from the Women's Employment Survey. NOTE: The models also include dummy variables for each calendar year. The fi rst column in each specifi cation gives the hazard ratio for exit from food stamps accompanied by employment. The second column gives the hazard ratio for exit from food stamps without employment. The third column reports the signifi cance level on a test of equal proportionate effects on both types of exit. Exact partial likelihood method used for ties. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. "Diff." stands for "difference." SOURCE: Authors' calculations from the Women's Employment Survey. not return to welfare; however, many of them continue to receive food stamps.
We also evaluate two policy changes implemented by Michigan. As noted, in 2001, the state adopted an Electronic Benefi t Transfer system designed both to reduce fraud and to reduce the stigma of purchasing food by eliminating government coupons. Our analysis does not reveal any signifi cant change in the probability of food stamp exit following EBT implementation, perhaps because these two effects tend to offset each other. Because we have only time series variation in the EBT variable, concurrent changes such as the rising unemployment rate might reduce our ability to identify an EBT effect.
We also examine how changes in the state's treatment of assets affected exit from the initial spell. For about one year in the middle of the study period, the state could not exclude the value of a car from the food stamp asset test. We include a dummy variable for the months in which an asset test was in place and an interaction with this variable and the vehicle ownership variable. 9 We fi nd no evidence that asset testing affected the probability of exit, whether or not a woman owned a vehicle.
The third specifi cation includes an indicator for knowledge about program rules. In Fall 1999, respondents were asked, "Once anyone receiving cash assistance gets a job, do the rules say they will stop receiving food stamps?" About a third did not know that "no" is the correct answer. Those answering correctly are about one quarter less likely to leave food stamps than women who answered incorrectly or were unsure. This suggests that some women who exited from TANF may have left food stamps by mistake, thinking that they were no longer eligible. Table 5 .3 presents our analysis of the probability of reentering the food stamp rolls following an exit of at least two months. Many of the same attributes associated with a lower exit probability in Table 5 .2 are associated with a higher return probability here. For example, African Americans are more likely to return than whites, and those with more education than a high school degree are less likely to return (all columns, Table 5. 3). Similarly, women who are married or cohabiting are much less likely to return to food stamps than women who do not live with partners (columns 2 and 3). Women who are not working are about 1.7 times as likely as working women to return to food stamps; this is not surprising since nonworkers will have lower monthly incomes than workers. Additionally, when the county unemployment rate increases by one percentage point, women are 1.13 times as likely to return to food stamps. High unemployment rates likely translate into less job security and worse employment prospects for those looking for work and hence encourage women to return to food stamp receipt.
Women who own cars are about 30 percent less likely to return to food stamps than those who do not. Car ownership may be a proxy for greater economic stability, indicating that the woman has and expects to continue to have stable employment. Alternatively, women may be misinformed about the treatment of assets and, thinking that the car makes them ineligible, may not reapply. Any of these mechanisms could explain why car owners are less likely to return.
Women who experienced severe domestic violence in the year before the survey are about 50 percent more likely than others to return to food stamps. Some women may leave a violent relationship suddenly and unexpectedly and then seek public assistance. It represents a policy success when battered women return to food stamps as part of their coping strategy.
Knowledge of the food stamp eligibility rule concerning combining work and benefi ts does not predict with any statistical signifi cance who returns to the rolls (Table 5. 3, column 3) . This confl icts with the data in Table 5 .2 showing that program knowledge reduced the probability of an exit. The lack of relationship between knowledge and food stamp returns could be due to heterogeneity in the types of women who exited and are thus eligible to return. Some women may exit when they earn enough to make them ineligible for benefi ts. Their correct knowledge of the ability to combine work and food stamps cannot affect their likelihood of return since they are ineligible. Other women are eligible to combine employment and food stamp benefi ts but may be disproportionately likely to believe incorrectly that they are ineligible. The women who knew they were eligible may have never left the caseload. This differential selection can explain the insignifi cant results for the knowledge indicator in the return specifi cation.
Women were much less likely to return to food stamps after coupons were replaced by the Bridge Card in 2001. This result does not support the hypothesis that EBT removed a stigma that was keeping women from participating. We do not consider this a defi nitive test of the effect of EBT on participation because the policy changes only once over the sample period and could easily be confounded with other factors changing at a similar time. The specifi cation in Table 5 .4 is similar to that in Table 5 .3, except the sample is restricted only to those who have exited a food stamp spell and who have experienced a transition from work to nonwork. The results are quite similar to those in Table 5 .3, with the exception that women who have mental health problems are about 50 percent more likely to return to food stamps during a spell of unemployment than those who do not have mental health problems.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our empirical results provide some good news from a policy perspective. First, food stamp participation among WES respondents was more sensitive to employment variability than was TANF receipt. Second, those with health and mental problems are less likely to exit food stamps with work, but they are not more likely to exit without work. Women in larger households are less likely than similar women in smaller households to exit, probably because their earnings are farther below the food stamp eligibility cutoff, which increases with household size. Similarly, (1) (2) (3) Assets used to determine eligibility (1.748) when the county unemployment rate is higher and when women experience job loss, they are more likely to return to the Food Stamp Program. We also fi nd that women with recent experiences with severe abuse are more likely than others to return to the food stamp rolls. These fi ndings tell us about the relative likelihood of staying on or returning to food stamps, not about the participation rate of eligible families. Increased outreach efforts might be warranted, given the confusion respondents express about food stamp rules and given their employment instability. Women who understand that they are allowed to combine food stamp receipt with low-wage work are signifi cantly more likely to continue to receive food stamps. On the other hand, women who own vehicles are less likely to return to food stamps, perhaps indicating misunderstanding about car ownership rules. An outreach program that provided information about eligibility might increase participation rates.
Although the typical respondent in our Michigan sample worked in almost 70 percent of the months over the six-and-one-half-year panel, more than half experienced at least one spell of "unstable employment," defi ned as having been fi red, laid off, or otherwise not having worked for more than four weeks (Johnson 2006 NOTE: The models also include dummy variables for each calendar year. Exact partial likelihood method used for ties. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. SOURCE: Authors' Calculations from the Women's Employment Survey.
Table 5.4 (continued)
A study of local agency practices indicates that it may not be the particular type of outreach activity that matters but the number of activities in which an offi ce engages (Bartlett, Burstein, and Hamilton 2004) . Outreach is usually low-cost and includes activities such as preparing informational pamphlets and posters for distribution in community centers and other public places, operating a toll-free information hotline, and coordinating outreach activities with the local Medicaid and State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) offi ces. Such activities better provide information about eligibility to eligible nonparticipants.
Although economic conditions in the nation have improved since the 2001 recession, many low-income families have not yet benefi ted from the recovery: poverty rates remain above 2000 levels, and the number of individuals who are food-insecure increased by six million between 1999 and 2004 (Rosenbaum 2006) . The Food Stamp Program provides economic support for millions of working poor families, and our results suggest that more should be done to encourage eligible nonparticipants to apply for the benefi ts to which they are entitled.
5. Respondents were asked if they were married or cohabiting and, if so, for how many months. Single women were asked to specify the month in which a previous marriage or cohabiting relationship ended. 6. These estimates use the cumulative incidence approach, so the probabilities add to one. 7. We use the exact partial likelihood method to handle ties (exits occurring in the same month) because our exits are measured in discrete time intervals. 8. To estimate these models, we augment our data using the methodology outlined in Lunn and McNeil (1995) . 9. The WES survey asks a respondent if she owns a vehicle or has consistent, reliable access to one. We label all positive responses as vehicle ownership, even though some women do not own a vehicle. There is measurement error for these women, since their use of someone else's car would not affect their food stamp eligibility. 10. A limitation of our study is that our sample is drawn from a particular county in a single state. Both TANF and food stamp policies vary by state, and our fi ndings may not be generalizable to states with different policy regimes. However, it seems reasonable to assume that lack of knowledge of program rules is a common problem that might be addressed by outreach efforts.
